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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established in 
1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the University of 
Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Roberts, the 
chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the Graduate Magazine 
that 
the Chancellor should invite to. the University for a lecture or a 
series of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure to 
speak on "Values of Living" -just as the late Chancellor 
proposed to do in his courses "The Human Situation" and 
"Plan for Living." 
In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of the 
Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of social 
betterment by bringing to the University each year outstanding 
world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, yet with a design 
so broad in its outline that in the years to come, if it is deemed 
wise, this living memorial could take some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKean lectured on "Human Rights and International 
Relations.'' The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett C. 
Hughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas School of 
Law as part of his book Students' Culture and Perspectives: Lectures on Medical 
and General Education. The selection of lecturers for the Lindley series has 
since been delegated to the Department of Philosophy. 
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How Free Does The Will Need To Be? 
Bernard Williams 
The irrelevance of constraint 
Locke memorably said I that the question was not whether the will be 
free, but whether we have a will. Afortiori, it cannot be a question of how 
free the wilJ may be. Locke's remark reminds us that the freedom of the 
will that has been the subject of the classical problem, if it comes at all, 
does not come in degrees. People's freedom, however, in more everyday 
senses, obviously enough does come in degrees. 
This point raises a question not only about the classical problem of 
freewill, but also about the classical compatibilist answer to it, based on 
the idea that freedom is opposed to constraint and not to necessity. That 
position certainly deploys an idea of freedom, but of a freedom that may 
be more or less extensive, and that fact in itself should make us ask 
whether the position does not miss the point of the problem it is 
supposed to resolve. It is far from clear what exactly constraint2 is, but 
in the kinds of cases usually invoked, somebody brings it about, by 
intentional application of threats or force, that an agent either cannot 
attain his original goal at all, or can attain it only at an increased cost. 
The agent may be confronted by a highwayman who (whatever the 
standard formula says) does not in fact offer him a choice between his 
money and his life, but rather a choice between losing merely his money, 
and losing his money together with his life; in that case, he cannot attain 
the goal of keeping his money at all. On the other hand, a man who 
possesses a valuable secret may be able to attain at least part of his 
objectives, and frustrate his captors, if their threat to kill him leaves him 
with the option of dying with his secret. 
But what significance is there in the fact that the cases standardly 
invoked are cases of constraint-that is to say, cases in which the 
limitation of effective choice is deliberately imposed, for their own ends, 
by other agents? These are merely one sort of what Aristotle rightly and 
relevantly identified as "actions done through fear of greater evils", 
such as that of the sailors who throw the cargo overboard to save 
themselves and the ship. 3 In the cases that do not involve other people's 
hostile intentions, the agent's original objective may equally be made 
more costly, or it may become inaccessible, or his objectives may need to 
be modified in one way or another. 
Now in all cases of things done through fear of greater evils, whether 
that fear is imposed by other agents or not, there is no loss of freewill, in 
any sense that has to do with the agent's capacity to choose, or with his 
being held responsible. The agent is responsible for his action; he may 
not be responsible for the loss of the goods or whatever, just in the sense 
that a course of action that would have been unreasonable or blamewor-
thy in ordinary circumstances is reasonable and not blameworthy in the 
constrained circumstances. This is very obvious when the agent's 
original objective is accessible, though at greater cost, but similar points 
apply to the cases in which a course of action usually or previously 
thought available becomes unavailable. People are indeed seen as 
responsible for their actions in such circumstances, as when Aristotle's 
sailors are complimented for their prudence, or alternatively told off for 
panicking. In such circumstances you can of course be excused for not 
doing something that you would otherwise be blamed for not doing; 
more than that, you can be complimented for not trying to do it. 
If we look at the larger class of things done through fear of greater 
evils, we are not going to learn much relevant to freewill or to ideas of 
compatibilism. It might be said that these are things that people do 
"against their will". But things done against one's will, in such 
circumstances, are not even ( except in a very everyday sense) things that 
one does when not wanting to do them-a possibility that might shed 
some light on compatibilism. They are things that one did not originally 
want to do, or which one would not want to do unless the circumstances 
were exceptionally disadvantageous, and their possibility does not shed 
any more light on the question of compatibilism than is shed by other 
actions that are performed under limiting circumstances. 
If we are not to count as exercising freewill in cases of this kind, then 
we never exercise it, since all choices operate in a space of alternatives 
constrianed by the contingent cost of various possibilities, and these 
exceptional cases are simply dramatic cases of that, where the space has 
been unexpectedly restricted. It makes no difference to this central 
aspect, so far as the agent's decisions and their status are concerned, 
whether the space of possibilities has been altered by a human being 
with the intention of doing just that. But the cases in which that is so are 
the ones that count as cases of constraint. So constraint is a red herring 
so far as freewill is concerned. 
There are of course some important differences between actions 
done under constraint, and other actions done from fear of greater evils. 
If the restrictions are humanly imposed, they are likely to elicit 
resentment as well as frustration. Moreover, constraint is peculiarly 
related to the deliberative conclusion that one must or has to do a certain 
thing (a kind of conclusion I shall come back to in section 5 below). 
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Conclusions reached under constraint are not always of that form, but 
they often are. When such conclusions are reached in other situations 
they characteristically express some project or objective with which th; 
agent is deeply identified, for instance (though by no means exclusively) 
requirements of morality. What is peculiar about these conclusions 
when they are reached under constraint is that they witness to the 
agent's vital interests or deepest needs only negatively, as things to be 
protected: the actions required are the expression of someone else's 
intentions and can lie indefinitely far away from anything with which the 
agent is identified. 
Such considerations can indeed help to explain why constraint is 
perceived as specially opposed to freedom, and more so than the nasty 
choices, or lack of choices, laid in our path by nature. But the very fact 
that decisions taken under constraint are decisions, and can take the 
form of practical necessity, a form that belongs to some of the most 
serious and responsible decisions we take, itself shows how constraint 
has nothing to do with the question of freewill. 
2 What the reconciling project must be 
The old compatibilism made a lot out of the opposition between 
freedom and constraint. If the argument of section 1 is right, it was 
looking in the wrong direction. But that is not the only reason why we 
have to recast the question of compatibilism, or, as we may say, the 
reconciling project. As it is usually described, the reconciling project 
involves an important, structural, misconception. Its task is explained in 
terms of taking two recognizable items-determinism (or something like 
that), on the one hand, and on the other hand, something that is often 
called "moral responsibility"-and trying to reconcile them with one 
another. But this account of the task underdescribes it, because there are 
not two, but three items or sets of items to be accounted for. They are, 
first, determinism (or something like that); second, a class of psychologi-
cal items, such as choice, decision, or rational action; and, third, some 
ethical items such as blame or responsibility. Since there are three items 
or classes of items involved, there is more than one way of understand-
ing what would be involved in reconciliation. It may be thought that 
what need to be reconciled are determinism and choice, where choice is 
understood as a psychological item, and that if this can be achieved, the 
ethical notions will be able to live with determinism. Alternatively, it 
may be thought that even if the psychological items can be reconciled 
with determinism, this may not be enough to save the ethical notions, 
which require something more-something that excludes determinism. 
If this further demand is put in terms of choice, it might be expressed by 
saying that responsibility and similar ethical notions require real choice, 
and real choice is not a purely psychological notion, but a metaphysical 
one. I shall come back to this idea. 
As well as undercounting the items involved, reconcilers have tended 
to make the further mistake of thinking that we understand the ethical 
items at least as well as we understand the psychological items. A similar 
mistake is often made by their opponents as well. Of course, the 
reconcilers and their opponents do not necessarily think that they have 
the same determinate understanding of the ethical notions-notions such 
as, in particular, "moral responsibility". Because of these differences, 
the opponents sometimes say that the reconcilers have failed to show that 
our actual ethical notions are compatible with determinism, but, rather, 
have changed the subject and brought in a reductive and inadequate 
version of those notions. Both parties, however, do tend to agree on two 
things: that we have a determinate understanding of the relevant ethical 
notions, and that what we have to worry about, if anything, is just the 
relation of those notions to determinism (or something like that). 
The truth is that we have other reasons to worry about many of our 
moral notions, and if we have come to have difficulty in understanding 
ideas such as "moral responsibility", this is not simply because of our 
suppositions, hopes and fears about naturalistic explanations of action. 
It is to some extent because of this, and inasmuch as compatibilism was, 
like its opponents, wedded to "moral repsonsibility" as the ethical term 
that had to be reconciled to naturalistic explanation, it has failed. But, 
more significantly, we have reasons anyway for being doubtful about 
"moral responsibility". 
The reconciling project has surely had some success. The immense 
literature on these subjects seems to me to have established some things 
beyond reasonable doubt. One is that determinism is not what the 
problem is about. There may have been a time when belief in a universal 
determinism looked like the best reason there was for expecting strong 
naturalistic explanations of psychological states and happenings, but, if 
that was once the case, it is no longer so. It now looks a great deal more 
plausible and intelligible that there should be such explanations than 
that the universe should be a deterministic system, and it is the 
possibility of those explanations that itself creates the problem. '' Strong 
naturalistic explanation" is an extremely vague phrase, and it may be 
said that a good deal more needs to be known about what it means, 
before we can know what the problem is supposed to be. It may be said, 
in particular, that only tight nomological explanations can generate the 
problem, because only they can introduce must. I doubt that this is 
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correct. As Dennett/ has pointed out, the chance of being able to cash 
in the nomological claim at the only level to which it could apply, that of 
a repeatable micro-state, is vanishingly small. Equally, the mere failure 
to do so (because of randomness, for instance) would be uninteresting in 
itself, while strong psycho-physical explanations that did not meet that 
standard could equally create unease for the ethical items, if anything of 
that sort could. 
It certainly remains unclear what the strongest kind of psycho-
physical explanation might be like. But I do not think that so far as these 
questions are concerned, it matters a great deaJ what exactly it might be 
like. It must in any case be sensible to test the psychological and ethical 
notions against the strongest hypotheses we could possibly entertain 
about psycho-physical explanation. Further, there is a substantive 
reason for this policy. So far as these issues are concerned, the answers to 
questions about psycho-physical explanation will matter only if the 
outlook for the psychological and the ethical items is sensitive to those 
answers. But a second thing that, as I see it, has now been established 
beyond reasonable doubt is that the outlook for the psychological items 
is not sensitive to those answers. Work by O'Shaughnessy5 and others 
seems to me to have shown that those concepts can function compatibly 
with the strongest hypotheses about explanation. We have good reason 
to believe that, insofar as they are psychological notions, all the 
following are compatible with any conceivable possibility of naturalistic 
explanation: choice; reasoned choice, and decision; action; intentional 
action; reasoned intentional action; and what is entailed by that, trying. 
These arguments seem to me to have achieved the reconciling 
project so far as the relevant psychological items are concerned, and if 
that is right, the remaining work should lie in bringing the ethical items 
into an intelligible relation with the psychological items. However, 
opponents of the reconciling project may complain that to go about 
things in this way is to beg the question. They may say that to treat 
choice as a merely psychological notion is to miss the point of the freewill 
problem, which lies in our needing, for our ethical conceptions, an idea 
of choice that has metaphysical implications. If that were true, then 
certainly one would not have made much progress by showing that a 
purely psychological notion of choice could be reconciled with strong 
psycho-physical explanation. So something needs to be said about 
metaphysical notions of choice. 
3 Clwice as objectively determining 
The basic argument to the effect that we have and need a meta-
physical notion of choice goes, I take it, like this. When we (really) 
choose, we for the first time bring it about that a certain event will occur; 
we determine, by or through our choice, that the course of events will 
have one character rather than another. We can do this only if there are 
objective possibilities in a strong sense. What is involved in this can be 
conveniently represented in a temporal model with forward-looking 
branches. An event that is possible at t is to be found in at least one 
branch later than t. Any event that has already been determined at I to 
happen is to be found in every branch later than I-that is to say, is 
necessary at t. To choose (really) at I that E will happen is to determine 
that E will happen, and requires that up to the moment of choice it was 
possible that E should happen and also possible that it should not 
happen. It trivially follows that E, if it is really chosen at I, cannot, at t, 
have been already determined. 
I shall try to show that this picture of things is hopeless, and that it 
cannot give its defenders what they want. Let E be the event that 
consists in A's doing a certain action, say G-ing. Then what exactly is it, 
on this account, that determines for the first time that E will happen? 
The point of the argument seems to be that A's choice should do this. 
But if determining means the closing of objective possibilities, then it will 
follow that if A chooses at I to G at some later time, then it is impossible 
from t on that A should not G; and that is absurd. No-one can need or 
want a notion of choice that leads to this result. 
There are then two options, either to bring the thing determined up 
to the choice, thus identifying it as something other than the action; or 
else to move the determination down to the action. The latter course 
would mean that this was no longer a doctrine about choice at all; or at 
least, that it was a doctrine only about such choosing as coincides with 
acting, prior choices not counting as (real) choices. But this does less 
than minimum justice to prior choosing, leaving it beached, so to speak, 
and out of any intelligible relation to the real choosing that supposedly 
occurs only when one acts. Prior choice becomes a mere harbinger of 
later action, and this cannot be what is wanted by those who have this 
picture, particularly since it is the experience of prior choosing that helps 
to encourage the picture in the first place. 
So we must take the first option. We will say that a prior choice does 
for the first time determine something, and that what it determines is 
that there exists a state of affairs which will, other things being equal, 
issue in the agent's G-ing at the appropriate later time. The state of 
affairs presumably consists in a state of the agent. But if the picture is 
going to yield an account of free action, only some such states will count. 
The ones that count-the ones that we call states of intention-will have 
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to be distinguished from such things as somnambulistic or drugged 
conditions into which, equally, A might put himself (if not quite so 
directly), and which, equally, might be expected to issue in his G-ing. 
(We all need to make such a distinction, and those who are drawn to this 
picture will be particularly keen to do so.) But in order to make that 
distinction, it looks as though we need to bring in two further conditions. 
One is that when A's state is the required one, intention, he could still 
change his mind. Another is that issuing in is not simply equivalent to 
causing. 
These further conditions, however, make it unclear again what, on 
the picture, choosing is supposed to effect. The first condition means 
that even after A has chosen there is still an objective possibility that E 
will not happen, and, moreover, whether that possibility is realized is 
still up to A. So how can his choice have done anything to shut any 
possibilities off? As for the second condition, it may be that issuing in is 
understood as at any rate a special case of causing. If it is understood in 
this way, then it will have been admitted that one can consistently say 
both that A is in a state which will cause his G-ing, and that he has the 
power even then not to G. Once that much has been admitted, the 
picture itself surely begins to seem less compelling (the fact that, 
according to the picture, A put himself into that state, though it supplies 
a consideration, does not supply it at the right point to weaken the force 
of the admission.) If, on the other hand, issuing in does not even imply 
causing, we are still in the dark about the difference that A's getting into 
this state is supposed to make. It looks as though A still has to do 
everything that he has to do in order to G, and we are back with the 
option rejected earlier, by which prior choice is at best only a harbinger 
of action. 
The picture of choice objectively determining outcomes is not 
unwelcome merely to someone who has a prejudice in favour of 
determinism or parsimony. Rather, in its own terms it makes no sense of 
the relations between prior choice, intention and action. It could not 
deliver what is wanted by those who are attached to it. 
4 Blame 
I come now to the relations between the second and third items that I 
picked out earlier, the psychological and the ethical. The item from the 
third area most favored in these discussions is, of course, "moral 
responsibility'', and that is usually explained in terms of blame. This is 
conceived as the rough analogy in the moral realm to legal penalties and 
denunciations. It is supposed to demand, more stringently than in the 
legal case, that the agent could have acted otherwise. 
Faced with the problem of accommodating these notions to deter-
minism, or at any rate to strong psycho-physical explanations, the 
standard reconciling strategy does two things. It tries to find, or at least 
postulates, a sense of could have acted otherwise that will be compatible with 
those explanations. But, in addition, it tries to find a function or point 
for blame, and that is characteristically found in some forward-looking 
reason for it, such as the modification of the agent's motives6 . It is 
interesting that the need should be felt for some such justification. The 
underlying idea seems to be that if blame were related to a non-
naturalistic could have, it would not need any other explanation or 
justification, but since it is not, it does. But why should that be so? If it is 
said that it needs justification because it is to some extent unpleasant, 
that would be just as true if there were a non-naturalistic could have as if 
there is not. I think that the search for an appropriate account of blame 
is motivated by a rather shifty thought that if the non-naturalistic story 
were true, blame would be really or straightforwardly justified, but since 
that story is false, it is not, and we shall have to find something else to 
justify it. 
The standard reconciling account, in terms of blame's effects, is too 
generous to blame, and at the same time sells it short. It sells it short by 
trying to base the justification of blame just on its efficacy. No such 
account can be adequate, because it collides with one of the most 
obvious facts about blame, that in many cases it is effective only if the 
recipient thinks that it is justified. Blame that is perceived as unjust often 
fails to have the desired results, and merely generates resentment. This 
shows that the idea of blame's justification is not the same as the idea of 
its efficacy. When a recipient thinks that blame is unjustified, the content 
of that thought cannot be that the blame will be ineffective. This does 
not show that the purpose of blame may not in fact lie in the 
modification of behavior; it means only that if this is true, it cannot be 
obvious to those who are effectively blamed. Like many such Utilitarian 
proposals, it is not so much self-destructive as inconsistent with ideals of 
social transparency, and most naturally fits a situation in which those 
who understand the justification, and those whose behavior is being 
modified, are not the same people7 . These complexities do mean, 
however, that if you are trying to say what blame is, you cannot simply 
cite its aims of modifying behavior. If blame is an instrument of social 
control, it is a peculiar one, and its peculiarities must be allowed for in 
the account of what it is. 
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The need to find something useful for blame to do illustrates the way 
in which the standard reconciling strategy has been, also, too generous 
to blame. Just like most of the libertarians who reject the reconciling 
project, it takes blame to be enormously important, the real thing. 
Indeed, there is a special form of ethical life, important in our culture, to 
which blame is central: we may call this special form of the ethical 
"morality"8 . Much discussion of freewill, on all sides, has shared the 
assumptions of morality, particularly about the central significance of 
blame. To correct those assumptions, there are several points to be 
borne in mind about blame itself. 
Judgements that express blame are only one kind of ethical judge-
ment among others. Inasmuch as blame is an ethical force, it is only one 
kind of ethical force, and it could not have its effects if it did not rely on 
other kinds. We have to learn what it is to be blamed, and (in line with a 
pattern familiar in ethical learning) we learn this by being blamed: by 
being, relative to the standards of later on, unjustly blamed. As soon as 
we look at blame not as a uniquely appropriate expression of truly moral 
judgement, and not, on the other hand, simply as an instrument of 
social control, but see it as part of a concrete ethical life, we shall be 
helped to understand the other psychological forces (such as love, 
perhaps) that are needed to make blame possible as a manifestation of 
the ethical dispositions. 
Blame rests, in part, on a fiction, the idea that ethical reasons, in 
particular the special kind of ethical reasons that are obligations, must, 
really, be available to the blamed agent. (This is not the same as the 
fiction of a non-naturalistic could have but it is connected to it.) He ought to 
have, as moral blame uses that phrase, implies there was a reason for him to 
do it, and this certainly intends more than the thought that we had a 
reason to want him to do it. It hopes to say, rather, that he had a reason 
to do it. But this may well be untrue: it was not in fact a reason for him, 
or at least not enough of a reason. Under this fiction, a continuous 
attempt is made to recruit people into a deliberative community that 
shares ethical reasons, and the truth misperceived by the reconcilers' 
causal story is this, that by means of this fiction people may indeed be 
recruited into that community or kept within it. But the device can do 
this only because it is understood not as a device, but as connected with 
justification and with reasons that the agent might have had; and it can 
be understood in this way only because, much of the time, it is indeed 
connected with those things. Blame, like some other ethical institutions, 
operates in a space between coercion and full deliberative co-operation• 
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Blame is expressed in the most tightly focussed of ethical judgements. 
It tries to relate itself, typically, to this very act, in these very 
circumstances (though the acts themselves may, of course, belong to 
various orders, such as adopting a policy). It is a good question, why our 
culture should have evolved an institution that has just this character. It 
is also a very large question, and I shall not try to discuss it here. But the 
fact that blame tries to work in tbis way is doubtless connected with the 
fiction of the agent's having reason to act in the required way, and with 
the fact that the stance of the scrupulous blamer is that of a transferred 
or identifying deliberator, a fellow member of the community of reason. 
These features lead blame, too, towards an ideal of the absolutely 
voluntary act; but, as I have already said, that consequence is not the 
first source of its difficulties. 
5 Freedom and practical necessity 
The deepest exploration in philosophy of the requirements of 
morality is Kant's ( which of course does not mean that those who 
disagree with Kant, such as Utilitarians, may not be deeply entangled 
with morality). Kant believed not only that there was an unconditional 
possibiltiy for action, or at least for trying to act, but also that there was 
an unconditional necessity, to be found in a certain kind of deliberative 
conclusion. This is a conclusion naturally expressed in the form "I 
must"; it may be called a conclusion of practical necessity9 . 
Kant understood practical necessity in terms of a reason for action 
that was not conditional on any desire at all, and he thought that there 
could be such a thing because he thought that the reasons of morality 
were baed on reason alone. That is why he identified practical necessity 
as uniquely moral necessity, and why, for him, unconditioned possibility 
and unconditioned necessity ultimately coincide, so that he could be led 
to say that the only truly free acts were those done for the sake of duty. 
I do not think that many of us believe this. There are certainly such 
things as conclusions of practical necessity, but it is not that they are 
determined by no desires or projects of the agent at all. Rather, they are 
determined by projects that are essential to the agent; roughly, if I 
abandon such a project, then I have no reason to go on (which is not to 
say that I will not go on). In well socialised agents, many of these 
projects will be compatible with, indeed expressive of, ethical considera-
tions, and we can understand why that should be so. But not all or 
everyone's are, and it may not be at all clear which are, and which are 
not, and how. One form of moral luck lies in never having to find out. 
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Dennett 10 has invoked necessity, as one among other kinds ol 
example, to show that we care less than theorists suppose whether the 
agent could have acted otherwise. Such conclusions are surely paradigm 
examples of accepting responsibility, and yet, as with any other kind of 
necessity, "I must" implies "I cannot not", and "I had to" implies "I 
could do nothing else''. So it looks as though responsibility does not 
entail "I could have acted otherwise", and the search for some 
reconciling explication of that formula loses some of its urgency. 
It would be a mistake to reject this argument on the supposition that 
practical necessity is a purely "normative" modality that has nothing to 
do with how things will be. It is plausible (though, as we shall see, it is 
not quite correct) to say that if a person rightly concludes that he must 
do a certain thing (has no alternative, cannot not etc.), then it is 
impossible, not that he should fail to do it, but that he should 
intentionally fail to do it. His conclusion does, then, have implications 
about the way the world will be, but the modality that occurs in them is 
still essentially deliberative, in the sense that the statement expresses the 
agent's intentions, and does not merely report an antecedent fact about 
the agent. If it did report an antecedent fact, then the agent's acceptance 
of it, if it did not express an unintelligible form of fatalism, would have 
to represent his recognition of a limitation on his powers; but in that case 
he could not do the thing in question even unintentionally 11 . 
What this modality represents is a recognition that one cannot 
intentionally do this thing when one has taken everything available to 
one into account, including this very deliberation. This helps to explain why 
the impossibility applies only to the intentional action. A fortion· it 
explains something else, that my conclusion of practical necessity does 
not imply that there is no possible world in which I figure as doing this 
thing intentionally. For, granted that there are other possible worlds in 
which I figure, I figure in some of them without my actual projects, and 
without my actual projects this practical necessity will not arise. This 
shows something further again, that practical necessity does not after all 
imply without qualification that the actual world will not contain my 
intentionally failing to do this very thing, where "this very thing" refers 
to the most specific description available to me of what I have decided I 
must do. If the demon scientist or a bolt from the blue changes radically 
my character and projects between now and the time of action, it may be 
that I shall intentionally fail to do this very thing, but it will (pace certain 
theories of personal identity) still be me 12 . 
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We can see, I think, how these various points hang together, if we 
take seriously the point that statements of practical necessity express 
intentions. Those statements bear much the same relations to a class of 
possible worlds, as ordinary statements of intention do to predictions 
about the actual world. When I say "I will ... " or "I am going to ... ", I 
make no assumption which is presupposed in arriving at any deliber-
ative conclusion, that I can reasonably count on certain future happen-
ings being brought about by this very conclusion, and by the projects 
and desires that have issues in this conclusion. When I say "I must" I 
imply that no possible world contains my not acting in this way, if it 
contains me with these projects, and permits the general conditions for 
my projects to be expressed in action. 
So is the could not of practical necessity the negation of the could in 
''he could have acted otherwise'', as Dennett's use of it in his argument 
implies? I doubt it. I think that the latter, the could that belongs with the 
institution of blame, must be meant to represent a possibility available 
to the agent in deliberating, that is to say, one that he could in principle 
recognize antecedently. But this is a difficult question, one that is made 
more difficult, perhaps insoluble, by the fact that because the institution 
of blame involves the fictional features I have mentioned, it is indetermi-
nate what it does demand in the way of could ( which may help to explain 
why so much difficulty has been found in analysing it). 
But the phenomenon of practical necessity does certainly show this at 
any rate, that my acknowledgement of responsibility can co-exist with, 
indeed be grounded in, a consciousness that I am not in the position of 
choosing between courses that I shall continue to see as equally open to 
me. Once one recognises this, and more generally raises one's eyes from 
the particular preoccupations of the ethical systems called "morality", 
one will see that the acknowledgement of responsibility has less to do 
with the concerns of blame, with regard to could have or anything else, 
than is made out. The phenomena of agent regret and of our capacity 
and need to acknowledge responsibility for what we have uninten-
tionally done, are other examples of the same thing. 
6 What have we got' 
Can the reconciling project succeed? Between determinism (or as 
much naturalistic explanation as you like), and relevant psychological 
concepts, yes. Between both of these, and the ethical conceptual scheme, 
no, not as it stands: or rather, the question is often indeterminate 
because it is indeterminate to what extent that scheme is committed to 
all the aspirations and misunderstandings of morality. 
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We need to recast our ethical conceptions. But that is not in order to 
escape or adjust ourselves to determinism or naturalistic explanation. 
We need to do so in order to be truthful even to what we know already 
about our psychology and much of our ethical life. It is a basic 
misrepresentation of the problem to pretend that it is only in the light of 
what we might discover about ourselves or our actions that we might 
need to reconsider our ethical ideas. But if we bring our ethical ideas 
nearer to reality, then assuredly we shall find that they are consistent 
with naturalistic explanations of our choices and actions. 
The will is as free as it needs to be. That does not mean, as 
libertarians would take it, that it is able to meet all the demands of the 
morality system as they present themselves to the uncritical con-
sciousness or, perhaps, conscience. Nor does it mean that it is free 
enough to keep the morality system in adequate business, as reconcilers 
usually take it to mean. It means that if we are considering merely our 
freedom as agents, and not the more important question of our political 
or social freedom, we have quite enough of it to lead a significant ethical 
life in truthful understanding of what that life involves. A truthful 
ethical life is, and always has been, one that can include our best 
understanding of our psychological life, and we know that such an 
understanding is compatible with naturalistic explanation. 
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